This paper examines the potential costs and benets associated with a risk-sharing policy imposed on all higher education institutions. Under such a program, institutions would be required to pay for a portion of the student loans among which their students defaulted. I examine the predicted institutional responses under a variety of possible penalties and institutional characteristics using a straightforward model of institutional behavior based on monopolistic competition. I also examine the impact of a risksharing program on overall economic eciency by estimating the returns to scale for undergraduate enrollment (as well as other outputs) among each of ten educational sectors.
Introduction
With total student loan debt and default rates at or near all-time highs, it is more important than ever to understand the impact that the high debt burden (and policies aimed at reducing this burden) will have on individuals and on the higher education landscape. From the individual's perspective, a high level of debt may delay or reduce nancial self-suciency, which has implications for countless other markets such as housing, occupation choice, or marriage. Further, those with particularly high levels of debt may never realize a positive nancial return on their investment in schooling. From a macroeconomic perspective, the approximately $1.2 trillion in outstanding debt from student loans (some economists go so far as to compare this to the real estate bubble which preceded the Great Recession) will impact the Federal budget for decades to come.
At the core of the problem is an increasing number of student loan defaults and delinquencies driven by rising tuition and poor initial job placements among recent graduates (the rate of defaults within 2 years of leaving school roughly doubled from 2004 to 2011).
There is, of course, substantial heterogeneity in default rates across institutional characteristics, ranging from a low of 7.2% among private non-prots to a high of almost 20% among private for-prot institutions. The prior gures have spurred a number of policy proposals aimed at incentivising schools to reduce their student loan default rates. One such policy mandates that institutions to be ineligible for federal nancial aid (such as Pell Grants) if their three-year cohort default rates are above 30% for three consecutive years, or above 40%
for one year. Due to the small number of schools actually impacted by this policy (Gross et al., 2009 ), many have called for a higher bar (i.e. lower required default rates) in order to continue receiving federal funding. An obvious drawback to such a policy is the discontinuous nature of the punishment. Institutions which fall just over the required default rate will face a funding crisis, as federal aid is crucial to the operation of the vast majority of institutions.
Similarly, students at these institutions will now be without a needed source of funding, even those for whom the education would have beneted. A second drawback is that this type 2 of policy provides no incentives to improve student outcomes for those institutions not near the cuto.
Another recently proposed policy to reduce defaults and overall student loan debt is to force schools to pay for a portion of the debt accrued by students who default on their student loans, also known as risk-sharing. While a policy of risk-sharing has received much less attention than federal aid eligibility cutos, it may be a theoretically more appealing option since it does not suer from the drawbacks listed above. First, students are not deprived of the opportunity to receive federal funds or forced to attend a less conveniently located school (if one even exists). Second, replacing the sharp discontinuity with a smooth punishment function incentivises all schools to lower their default rates, not just the worst oenders.
There are, however, potential downsides which are shared by both policies. Institutions could pass additional costs onto students in the form of higher tuition and/or reduce the number of students admitted. This paper evaluates the response of postsecondary institutions to various risk-sharing policies both in terms of tuition and enrollment. This is accomplished by incorporating the parameters from cost function estimates into a simple model of university behavior based on monopolistic competition. I also present updated estimates of the returns to scale and scope among university outputs in order to look at a possible loss of allocative eciency under a risk-sharing program.
I nd that even under pessimistic assumptions about the degree of default reduction schools are able to achieve, a risk-sharing program could bring about a sizable reduction in total student loan debt. However, such savings would likely come at a cost of modestly higher tuition rates, a tradeo which policymakers should consider when designing the program.
Furthermore, I nd no evidence that there would be a sizable loss of economic eciency if students are induced to enter a dierent educational sector as a result of a risk-sharing program.
The paper is constructed as follows: Section 2 discusses the previous literature. Section 3 3 describes the data and empirical methodology used to estimate institutional cost functions and responses. Section 4 provides a discussion of the ndings and their implications, and Section 5 concludes.
Previous Literature
This section presents a brief summary of the literatures which are touched on by this paper.
For a broader overview of the higher education scal landscape, see Ehrenberg (2012) or Ehrenberg (2014) .
A central focus of this paper is the estimation of cost functions among higher education institutions. The seminal paper in this literature is Cohn et al. (1989) , the rst study to estimate cost function parameters institutions of higher education and translate these parameters into the economically meaningful measures of economies of scale and scope. A number of studies have utilized the framework fromCohn et al. (1989) to provide similar measures for institutions in dierent countries or at dierent points in time (see Laband and Lentz (2003) or Sav (2011) to name just a few).
Since defaults on student loans are disproportionately concentrated among for-prot institutions, much of the political discussion surrounding defaults has focused on schools in that sector. While the literature which focuses specically on for-prot institutions is still relatively small, primarily due to a lack of high-quality data, there are several recent excellent studies which examine multiple aspects of the for-prot sector.. Cellini (2010) and Cellini and Goldin (2014) both illustrate the large role that federal student aid plays in the strategic decisions of for-prot institutions. Cellini (2010) nds that entry of new for-prot programs is directly tied to the availability and generosity of federal aid such as Pell Grants. Cellini and Goldin (2014) show that increases in the generosity of these programs leads to increases in tuition at for-prot institutions, a conrmation of the so-called Bennett Hypothesis, and important evidence which supports the model of institution behavior which is used in this paper.
Recent work also tends to nd that the costs (Cellini, 2012) and benets (Cellini and Chaudhary, 2014; Lang and Weinstein, 2013) of attending a for-prot college tend to be less favorable to students relative to other sectors. However, it is important to note there is selection along several dimensions into attending a for-prot university, and that not all groups have equal access to all educational sectors (Chung, 2012) .
The current paper also has substantial overlap with the growing body of research on student loans. For an excellent survey of both the practical and academic sides of student loans, see Avery and Turner (2012) . The strand of this literature which deals with default rates is the most relevant to the current study. Dynarski (1994) and Hillman (2014) examine the characteristics which correlate with eventual default on their loans, nding unsurprisingly that borrowers from low-income households, college dropouts, and those with the lowest post-college earnings were the most likely to default on their student loans. Ionescu (2009) tests the impact of various student loan policies (e.g. repayment exibility, eligibility requirements) on schooling decisions and default rates using a structural model of human capital accumulation.
Empirical Methodology
The goal of this study is to be able to predict how postsecondary institutions would respond to various student loan risk-sharing policies. This is accomplished in two steps: 1) estimate cost function parameters to obtain a marginal cost curve for each institution, and 2) use the cost curve estimates in a simple model of monopolistic competition to predict what the institutional response would be to a risk-sharing policy (modeled as a change in costs). Each step is described in turn below. While the main focus of this paper is not to generate estimates of institutional economies of scale and scope, these quantities are nonetheless useful when considering the optimal response to a change in costs. Following Cohn et al. (1989) , I present updated estimates of ray economies of scale, product specic economies of scale, and economies of scope for each 1 Other parameterizations were tested, including a quartic in each output category and a translog cost function. Results are available upon request. 6 of the ten institutional types studied. These quantities are dened as follows:
(2) P roduct Specif ic Economies of Scale (f or product j at time t) :
Economies of Scope (f or product j at time t) :
Ray economies of scale represent the impact on cost of a proportional increase of all products (i.e. undergraduate teaching, graduate teaching, and research), and are equivalent to product specic economies in the case of single-product rms. In the notation above, quantities with a superscript j refer to the item specic to product j (e.g. the marginal cost of undergraduate teaching), and quantities with a superscript -j refer to the item specic to all products except j (e.g. the total cost of all products except graduate teaching). The quantities above are calculated based on the estimates from Equation (1).
Estimating Institutional Responses
To predict how institutions will respond to a program such as risk sharing, we must rst posit a model for their optimal choice of output. In this paper, I assume that rms make decisions based on a simple model of monopolistic competition, where they choose output (e.g. undergraduate teaching) and price (tuition) based on marginal cost, marginal revenue, and demand.
At rst glance, a model based on prot maximization may seem inappropriate for schools in the nonprot sector. However, I assume that each institution's current output and price combination represents an optimal allocation, and only assume that institutions will respond to small changes in costs in a prot-maximizing manner. In this way, my strategy makes no assumptions about what objective function institutions are attempting to maximize in a global sense (e.g. prot, prestige, research, school rank), but only assumes that they will respond to a small increase in costs in a way which minimizes the negative impact on their budgets. While the validity of this assumption still likely varies across institutional type, it is relatively unrestrictive in that many institutions are currently under substantial budgetary pressure and likely do take costs into account when making strategic decisions.
In a sense, assuming a model of monopolistic competition is akin to assuming that the Bennett Hypothesis holds. As noted above, the recent evidence is strongly in favor of this point among for-prot institutions (Cellini and Goldin, 2014) . The evidence on other sectors of higher education still seems to support some degree of Bennett Hypothesis response, although the evidence is more mixed when examining in-state tuition at public universities (Long, 2004a; Stingell and Stone, 2007) .
Based on the estimates from Equation (1) In order to assess the response of the institution to a risk-sharing program, I then shift the marginal cost curve up according to the following equation:
whereM C is the estimated marginal cost curve derived from Equation (1), riskpremium is the fraction of default costs the institution is asked to pay for, %default is the fraction of defaults observed at the institution (this is dened at the institution type level based on data from the Department of Education), %loan is the share of each institution's students who receive student loans, and averageloan is the average dollar value of the loans held by students with a loan (the latter two variables are obtained from IPEDS that of public institutions. The disparity grows even larger when taking into account that about four out of 5 students attending for-prot institutions receive student loans, while less than half of the student body at the typical public institution takes on debt (and only 11% 9 of students at public 2-year schools). These gures are important for interpreting the results below.
Coecient estimates and standard errors (clustered at the institution level) from Equation (1) run separately on each institution type are shown in Table 2 . The model t is fairly strong for most institution types, and does not change much when other more exible functional forms are utilized (e.g. quartic). Given that the focus of this paper is on predictions at individual institutions, a simpler functional form is actually preferable, since a quartic specication can lead to implausible responses for outlier institutions. While the estimates in Table 2 are not the focus of the paper (they are used to construct the marginal cost estimates), the results are in line with similar estimates from the prior literature (Cohn et al., 1989; Laband and Lentz, 2003; Sav, 2011) . A value of greater than one for either ray or product specic economies of scale implies increasing returns to scale, while a value of less than one implies diseconomies of scale.
Economies (diseconomies) of scope exist when the estimate is positive (negative).
Several interesting results stand out from the scale and scope calculations. First, private (both for-prot and non-prot) tend to have larger scale economies than their public counterparts. This is not at all surprising given the prot motives of for-prot institutions and the focus on small class sizes of private non-prots. Second, while not a perfect comparison, these estimates appear somewhat larger (greater economies of scale) than similar estimates using older data (Cohn et al., 1989; Laband and Lentz, 2003) despite considerable growth in enrollments. Anecdotally, this may be attributed to technological advances such as online learning. I am not aware of any work which rigorously examines the causes of such changes in cost structure over time, but it appears to be a potentially interesting question for future 10 research.
Tables 4-6 show the predicted results of a risk-sharing program where the institution must pay for 20% or 50% of its students' defaults. Table 4 presents the results when the assumed demand elasticity is .1, Table 5 presents the results when the elasticity is .3, and Table 6 assumes an elasticity of .5. These elasticities approximately correspond to the low, middle, and high end of tuition elasticities estimated in the literature, see Long (2004b) for an excellent example of how such elasticities can be estimated using detailed individuallevel data. The predictions are generated using data only from the most recent survey
year (Academic Year 2010 -2011 . The standard errors for each prediction are obtained by bootstrapping the regressions and response models together.
The rst row of each panel shows the median predicted increase in annual in-state tuition (in constant 2014 dollars). The largest increases, as would be expected, are seen in the institutions with the highest default rates, loan amounts, and prevalence of loans. Focusing on Table 5 , tuition at for-prot institutions would be expected to rise by $165 per year for the typical institution under a 20% risk-sharing plan (1-2%), or between $400-$500 under a 50% risk-sharing system (3-4%). For all other institution types, the tuition hikes would be considerably smaller, rarely exceeding 2% even under 50% risk-sharing
The third row presents the expected decline in the entering cohort summed up over all institutions within an institution-type. A 20% risk sharing system is expected to reduce rst-year cohorts at for-prot institutions by 14,000-15,000 students annually, substantially greater than the loss of about 400 students combined at public and private PhD institutions.
From a policy perspective, the loss of college graduates is likely of greater importance than the reduction of entering cohorts, these gures are presented in the fth row of each panel. The model estimates suggest that 2,254 four-year degrees and 4,466 2-year degrees would be lost annually among for-prot institutions under the 20% risk sharing system (5,636 and 11,166 under the 50% rule). However, these gures essentially assume that institutions would reduce their enrollment in a fashion which is uncorrelated with the likelihood of grad-uation. Given that eventual default is most likely negatively correlated with the likelihood of graduate, institutions would be incentivised to target their enrollment cutbacks at students who are highly unlikely to graduate, and thus these gures represent upper bounds.
Finally, the seventh row in each panel calculates the total student loan debt which would be saved annually by a risk-sharing program. The for-prot sector would account for about $13 million in lower student debt under a 20% risk-sharing plan, or up to $80 million under the 50% proposal, far outpacing other sectors (assuming a tuition elasticity of .3).
The predictions up to this point have made the (hopefully) unreasonable assumption that institutions would make no eorts to reduce defaults, and would instead respond only by reoptimizing their tuition and enrollment levels. A more realistic assumption might be a small (10%) drop in default rates by investing more heavily in students' post-graduation outcomes, or at the very least by not recruiting students who are highly unlikely to benet from a college education (and thus will have trouble repaying the debt they incur). Table 7 reports the same predicted outcomes from Tables 4-6, but with the assumption that default rates are lowered by ten percent. By assuming a lower default rate, the costs to each institution are lower, and thus the tuition and enrollment responses are less severe. Although the savings in total student loan debt are considerably larger ($42 million annually under 20% risk-sharing and $130 million under 50% risk-sharing among the for-prot sector).
One potential worry of any intervention is that there may be a loss of overall economic eciency. Given that the above results imply that for-prot institutions, particularly 4-year for-prots, may see moderate enrollment declines, it is worth asking whether a risk-sharing program might push students into a sector where they are more costly to educate. Turing back to Table 3 , we see that this is unlikely to be the case. The returns to scale at a 4-year for-prot are virtually the same as at 4-year private non-prots, and the returns to scale are greater at public 2-year institutions than at for-prot 2-year schools.
So is a risk-sharing program a good idea? The answer depends on how much institutions will focus on reducing student defaults due to the new incentives and the type of student who is likely to be pushed out of higher education as a result. The above results imply that even a relatively modest improvement in default rates would make the program a sensible one. While there is no way to know for sure that this type of behavior would occur, we can look at the implementation of stricter default standards in 1991 as a guide. Only the worst institutional oenders were punished with a loss of federal nancial aid (default rates greater than 30%) as a result of the 1991 law change, but this also means that only a subset of schools faced any change in incentives whatsoever (a school with a 20% default rate had no incentive to change their behavior because they were not close to the threshold). Average
3-year cohort default rates dropped from 22.4% in 1990 to 15% in 1992 (a 33% drop!) and
continued to decline over the next several years.
The downside to such a program is apparent from the above results, a potential reduction in college graduates and an increase in tuition. While there would almost certainly be some reduction in college graduates from a risk-sharing program, there are many reasons to believe the overall impact would be small. Non-prot institutions, particularly public 2-year institutions, would likely absorb many students displaced from their for-prot counterparts since their goal is denitionally not prot-maximization. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that many students do not actually receive a nancial benet from going to college when balanced against the explicit tuition cost and the opportunity cost of time spent out of the labor force (Webber, 2015) . Assuming that a disproportionate share of those who fail to enroll in higher education as a result risk-sharing would not actually benet from the experience in the long run, then this negative aspect is less of a concern.
However, tuition increases are a much greater concern if some sort of risk-sharing program is implemented. Given the substantial increase in tuition over the past several decades, policymakers must be mindful of any additional cost pressure which is put on postsecondary institutions. Fortunately, since a risk-sharing program will save money, these funds could be reinvested in institutions which achieve low default rates, putting downward pressure on ballooning tuition.
5 Conclusion
As student loan debt continues to rise, a wide variety of policies aimed at reducing student debt and default rates have been proposed. This paper seeks to evaluate the costs and benets of one such proposal, often referred to as risk-sharing. Under a risk-sharing program, postsecondary institutions would be obligated to pay for a portion of the debt which is defaulted on by their students. In contrast to current regulations involving default rates which are only binding for schools with very high default rates, a risk-sharing program would incentivise all institutions to reduce their default rates.
This paper examines the potential response of institutions to the introduction of risk-
sharing under a variety of scenarios involving the magnitude of institutional penalties and the tuition elasticity of demand. I nd that even a small degree of improvement in default rates (10%) would lead to considerable savings in national student loan debt, with the bulk of the gains coming from 4-year for-prot institutions. Tuition increases are likely to be modest at most schools based on the results of this analysis, but policymakers should be aware that risk-sharing would put positive pressure on tuition rates. Furthermore, I nd no evidence that there would be a sharp decline in overall cost eciency in the event that a risk-sharing program induced students to enroll in a dierent educational sector. 
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Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping Equation (1), Equation (5), and the process described in the Empirical Methodology section together. The rst row in each panel represents the median predicted increase in tuition. The third and fth rows present the total loss in rst-year enrollment and expected college graduates summed over all institutions within each sector. The seventh row reports the expected savings in student loan debt calculated by adding the institional penalty for defaults and the debt which is saved by lower enrollments. 
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